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1\;fAN & COl\IP ANY, YOUNG & SMITH 
CONSTRUCTION CO:NIP ANY, UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION COJ\fP ANY, 
Petitioners & Appellants, 
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pARTMENT OF El\IPLOYJ\IENT 
~ECURITY, 
Respondents & Appellees 
~ .... r•t '"' REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE 
Attorneys for the Petitioners 
Allan E. Mecham, 
Attorney at Law 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
STATUTES CITED 
4:2-2a-5 U. C.A. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
AuTHORITIES CITED 
Ironworkers Union v. Industrial Commission, 
104 Utah 242·----------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Bucko v. Quest Foundry, 38 N. W. 2nd 223.................... 9 
Rhea Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
285 N. W. 7 49---------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization 
Commission, 209 Pac. 2nd 602----------------------------------- 11 
Nordling v. Ford Motor, 42 N. W. 2nd 576---·------------------ 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLOF NELSON CONSTRUCTION COM-
PANY, VINCENT-PETERSON CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, GRONE-
MAN & COMPANY, YOUNG & SMITH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Petitioners & Appellants, 
-vs.-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and THE BOARD OR RE-
VIEW, APPEALS REFEREE 'and 
CLAIMS SUPERVISOR of its DE-
pARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, 
Respondents & Appellees 
Case No. 7633 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
Respondents avoid reference to Paragraph (d) fol-
lowing Paragraph (1) of 42 -2a-5. U.C.A. Paragraphs 
(1) and (d) should be construed together and were con-
strued by this court in Ironworkers Union v. The Jn-
justrial Commiss~OIJ., 104 "Qt_~h 242 ·~ .. "it is not only 
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2 
those who foment the strike or bring it about who are 
r ineligible, but the group to which such persons belong-
however inclusive-the group for whose benefit the strike 
is called.'' 
The Claimants were unemployed because of a stop-
page of work which existed as a result of 1a strike involv-
ing th~ir grade, clas~ or group of workers at the establish-
ments at which they were last employed, and the strike 
was fomented by Claimants through their duly authorized 
union representatives, and the Claimants are workers 
of the grade, class or group of workers and parties to 
the plan or agreement to foment the strike. 
Respondents contend on page 7 of their Brief, "If 
the Claimants are to he disqualified under this provis-
ion of the Act, it is necessary to ~adopt the theory that 
because the representatives of the six basic crafts were 
negotiating for the six crafts no "pressure" action 
t ~ 
I 
could be taken by the unions short of affecting the entire 
m~mber~~}P.:_Q(t};le_ -A:.s:~-2-~J~ted General Contractors ... '' 
Respondents statement aforesaid is correct.:. The 
·entire construction industry was· affected by the negotia-
tions between the two groups. There was a perceptible 
,.slow-down on all construction jobs just prior to the strike 
and immediately subsequent to the strike. It is an ob-
vious reaction of all workmen to apply any strategy at 
their command including a slow-down in work if neces-
sary to support the objective of their union. This is ex-
actly what was done in this case, and the record is clear 
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on that point. The whole industry was influenced as the 
negotiation developed and this influence was felt be-
fore and after the strike. To hold that the two picket 
lines \Yas strike action against the two construction pro-
jects only would .be contrary to the evidence that s'aid 
two pickets effected the entire construction industry. 
Page 23 and 24 of the Record 
~IR. GEORGE PUTNAili, 
UTAH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
"Q. Now, if you know, will you tell us what, if any, 
effect, the strike of the Earl S. Paul job and the strike 
at the Professional Building on June 2nd, what effect 
that those two strikes had on the other members signa-
tory to the contract that continued working until the 
shut-down? 
"A. I can answer that by giving our experience on 
our own work and give 'an opinion as to what effect it 
had on the others. 
"Q. Do that, please. 
''A. On our own work, we definitely experienced a 
slow down. We attempted to measure that at the refinery 
job where we had some six or seven hundred men. 
"Q. By that, you mean a decrease in production~ 
"A. That's correct. Groups of men were standing 
around gabbing, they didn't care if they worked or not.'' 
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4 
On Page 51 of the Record, Ellis W. Barker stated ns 
follows: 
'' Q. What effect, if any, as far as you can ascertain 
did the strike at the Professional Building have on the 
other operations prior to the time the work was closed 
down~ 
''A. Well, during the day of the 2nd, when it became 
known around town mainly that our job was struck, we 
didn't know until the day wore on what other jobs would 
·be struck. I expected momentarily to have my foreman 
call up to say that pickets had appeared. We were in 
touch with each other constantly. As rar as I could tell, 
the men were doing the same as George (Putnam) re-
ported, ,talking, hesitating, discussing the situation 
among themselves with the effect ·of a perceptible slow-
down in production.'' 
On Page 52 of the Record 
''MR. MECHAM: I .am trying to show that un-
til the carpenters ratified the 'agreement, there was a 
digression in the workmen's production. Until the 
contract was ratified, there was some feeling on the 
job. 
Mr. Barker: 
"Q. Is that a substantially correct statement¥ 
"A. Yes, the fact is that on the day that the 
men were supposed to be ordered back to work, the 
carpenters did not show. The pickets appeared on 
job following the .agreement of the negotiating par-
ties.'' 
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5 
Only two picket lines were employed by the unions 
to accomplish their strike. The union strategy was quite 
obvious. The strike was against the entire bargaining 
unit. This fact is concluded because: (a) The labor 
agreement of 1949 was still in force at the time of the 
·strike; (b) The unions and the Association had estab-
lished a long practice of bargaining as a unit; (c) No 
demands for separate negotiations were made against 
the Barker and Paul firms (the two firms picketed), and 
if such demands had been made, these two firms could 
not have bargained individually with the unions because 
of the fact that they were contractually bound to the bar-
gaining unit under the terms of the Labor Agreement 
dated August 12, 1949; (d) The entire operations of the 
two companies were not picketed, which brings us to the 
conclusion that the unions intended not to strike the two 
companies as a company unit, but rather to take a "nib-
ble" at only a small portion of the bargaining unit. The 
unions apparently were not striking the company as 
such. If we accept the reasoning of t¥ Respondents· we 
must conclude that the u!!i~~~-~~- nQ__t striking _!pe 
company nor the bargaining unit of ft..G.C._ Who and 
. -·---- -------- ---
what, then were they striking~ (e) The facts are undis-
puted that at all times the bargaining was done through 
hnd by the established bargaining unit even though as 
Respondents contend, the unions could have bargained 
with the individual members of the Associated Gen~ 
eral Contractors. Had the unions elected to bargain with 
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6 
the individual members of the Associated General Con-
tractors they would have elected to breach their contract 
with the bargaining unit. 
The Claimants would have continued their work had 
not they been of the grade, class or group of workers 
fomenting the strike. Subcontractors on the construc-
tion jobs operated by the Petitioners and all material 
suppliers and their workmen continued their employ-
ment notwithstanding the strike. Materials were de-
livered to Petitioners jobs. It was only those employees 
who were financially interested in the strike and who 
benefited thereby whose employment was affected. 
Respondents contend that the strike was not at the 
establishment where Claimants were last employed (Re-
spondents Brief, page 9). The strik~ _!Vas actually _!t 
the est_ablishments as a group __Qf_ firms The legislature 
___ ........ --,......,.,. __ '7",h_.,.-,.. ,.......,.,. ... r • • "'=""=-..;...;:,"'->-.. OO~·- •• • \ 
did not use the plural of the term ''establishment,'' and 
it does not stretch the legislative intent to conceive that 
a strike at more than one establishment could, 1as in this 
case, occur concurrently. 
Actually the unions struck the bargaining unit with 
the hope of accomplishing a wage~ increase for all work-
men including the Claimants. In promoting this strike 
covering the whole construction industry, the union 
strategy was to employ only two small picket lines. 
Their strike could have :been just as effective had they 
not employed any pickets, or perhaps only one picket. 
, It is a recognized fact that a :strike may be a "slow-
down," a "sit-down," "internal agitation," "walk out" 
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or any form of labor unrest with or without pickets. In 
the instant case the unions elected to use only two pickets 
to accomplish their strike. All parties agree that the 
union's strategy was attended by success and the Claim-
ants received their increase in wage and the wages of 
workmen in the entire construction industry of Utah 
from Kanab on the south, to Richmond, on the north 
were increased as a result of the union's efforts. 
The unions well knew that the employment of pickets 
on all jobs would render unbearable their unemploy-
ment problem among their members and would result 
in their own treasury financing the strike of approxi-
mately ten thousand men. To 'accomplish their strike 
against the bargaining unit the union ferreted out only 
two construction jobs on which to employ their pickets. 
On page 82 of the record Mr. R. S. Roberts, Secre-
tary of The Building Trades Council, is asked on direct 
examination the following question: ''Did any of the 
business agents of any of the crafts, to your knowledge, 
advise the workers-other than Barker and Paul workers 
-not to report to work after J nne 1 ~ '' Answer : ''On 
the contrary. They were definitely instructed to keep the 
men working- outside of these two jobs- until the 
Stra,tegy Committee recommended further action.'' 
It appears from the aforsaid answer that the union 
definitely had a Strategy Committee employed and that 
it was just a matter of time until other jobs would be 
picketed in keeping with the strike against the bargain-
ing unit. 
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On page 85 on direct examination counsel asks the 
following question of Mr. Roberts: "Do you have any-
thing else to offer Mr. Roberts that you would like to 
offer to assist the Referee in making his findings on this 
case~" Answer: "No, the only thing that might help 
-that I would have to offer-is that in striking and 
placing a picket line on these particular jobs-is that the 
building trades organization, of course, are bound to 
certain conditions by certain laws, state laws and fed-
eral laws, that we have to comply with, and it was pos-
sibly through trying to comply with those laws that the 
picket lines were only established on the jobs that we were 
able to get a strike vote on before they were picketed. 
I think it was their intention to go on through and picket 
other jobs if they thought the occasion would warrant it 
to get the contractors lined up." 
The only logical interpretation of the above answer 
is that the strike was against the bargaining unit, ~and 
all jobs would be picketed as it became necessary to 
accomplish the union's objective. The Barker Company 
did not have any grievance with its employees. Like-
wise the Paul Company and all other signators to the 
labor contract did not have grievances with their em-
ployees. So the pickets were not employed to settle a 
grievance with Barker and Paul but to settle the wage 
problem for the entire industry. Barker and Paul did 
not learn of the pickets until the night before they 
appeared. 
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If, as we believe, under the terms of the said labor 
agreement of August 12, 1949, the unions were bargaining 
with a legally recognized bargaining unit, can we logically 
hold by any stretch of the imagination that our legislature 
in establishing the Employment Security Law enacted a 
device to permit the labor unions to finance their strike 
with state funds contributed by employers, thereby SlaV-
ing the union's treasury from paying strike benefits. 
It is a stipulated fact (T.R. 13, page 9 of Respon-
dent's Brief .... "That the individual Claimant is repre-
sented by his respective craft unit for purposes of col-
lective bargaining. '') 
Respondents cite the Minnesota case of Bucko v :.-
Quest Foundry, 38 N. W. 2~ 223-See page 10 of Re-
~---------~--------------~--spondent 's Brief. This case is distinguished from the 
case at bar in at least two particulars: (1) In the Min-
nesota case the labor agreement had apparently expired 
at the time of the strike !and/or lockout. In the instant 
case the labor agreement with its recognized bargaining 
unit was contractually in force and continuing during 
the negotiations and during the strike. (2) In the Min-
nesota case the appeals tribunal held that the lock-out 
occurred during negotiations. See page 231 of the re-
ports quoted as follows: "In any event the appeal tri-
.bunal found that the lock-out occurred during negotia-
tions. This finding is amply supported hy the evidence, 
so we are bound by it regardless of what construction 
is pl'aced upon the term 'lock-out.''' At page 223 it is 
quoted: ''In the second place the employers themselves 
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10 
have recognized the fact that the employees of the nine 
establishments were unemployed as the result of a lock-
out." In the case at Bar the volitional act was the picket 
lines on the two construction jobs. The Petitioners and 
other members of the contractors association did not 
close their construction projects until the Association 
was first notified by the Building Trades Council that 
the strike was on 'and pickets would appear on the two 
jobs. In the instant case the Petitioners did not close 
down their construction projects until the happening of 
the overt act of picketing by the unions. 
The Minnesota statute contains a special lock-out 
clause. The Utah 'Statute contains no such clause. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated at page 229 
of the Decision, ''Prior to the 1943 amendment the lock-
out was held to be a labor dispute within the meaning 
of the act so as to disqualify employees affected.'' The 
applicable section of the Minnesota statute prior to 1943 
apparently was similar to the Utah statute excepting 
the Minnesota statute used the words "labor dispute" 
instead of ''strike.'' Viewed in the lignfof the abo;e 
reasoning the Supreme Court of Minnesota by strong 
inference states that a contrary opinion might have 
been rendered under a statute similar to the Utah statute. 
Respondents cite the case of Rhea Manufacturing 
Company v. Industrial Commission, a Wisconsin case 
cited at 285 N. W. 749. See page 14 of Respondent's 
Brief. The Petitioners concur in the statement quoted 
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11 
by Respondents from the Rhea case. However, viewed 
in the light of the volitional test applied in McKinley v. 
California Employment Stabilization Commission 209 
Pac. 2nd 602 the closing of the construction projects 
merely resulted from strike action placed in motion .by 
the unions. Had the Petitioners closed down their con-
struction projects prior to the strike of course they 
would have no standing in this court. The dissenting 
judge in the Rhea case makes a very erudite statement 
of the subject: ''We should not lose sight of the ract 
that the most important weapon in the hands of the col-
lective ·bargaining representative is the threat of strike 
if the employer refuses to come to terms. The individ-
ual authorizes his collective bargaining representative 
to use this threat; in effect he authorizes the repre-
sentatives to refuse work if the terms 'are not satisfac-
tory. Collective bargaining is a stronger term than 
negotiation. An employer cannot afford to enter into 
a contract which binds him but does not bind individual 
workers.'' 
The Respondents attempt to rationalize the case of 
McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization Com-
mission, 209 Pac. 2nd 602. The factual situation present 
in the California ca:se is similar to the factual situation 
in the instant case and, of course, the Oalifornia__£~~-. 
ruled that a strike. aga!p._si one mem]2eLQf._a_b_argain.iJ1g 
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12 
unit was a strike against all and that claimants were 
,___ . .--- --=-----~------
not eligible for unemployment jlenefits within_the mean-
-lng ·::o£---th~--Employm.e._nt Semujty Law. -h 
-------·-----
: f:!'tt The Morand Beverage Case cited in Respondent's 
Brief at page 22 is an N.L.R.B. administrative tribunal 
decision and carries little, if any, weight in this court. 
The case of Nordling v. Ford Motor Company 42 N. 
W. 2nd 576 cited at page 24 of Respondent's Brief is 
distinguished from the instant case. The Minnesota 
statute is dissimilar to the Utah Statute and the Ford 
Motor case did not involve a bargaining unit •as in the 
instant case. 
At page 13 of the record, Mr. Dremann, attorney 
for the Industrial Commission made the following ad-
mission: "Carrying that out, it seems to me that is a 
ftact, isn't it~" In other words, to get all the facts be-
fore any higher appeals body-and this appeals referee, 
we have always taken the position regarding that that 
any bargaining representative designated automatic-
ally becomes the bargaining representative of all the in-
dividuals in the grade, class or group. There is no dispute 
that all the individuals in the six basic crafts fall within 
the grade, class or group which is being bargained for 
in the subject matter in this case." 
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13 
In conclusion we respectfully submit, that the un-
employment of the Claimants resulted from action taken 
by their union 'agents, that Claimants helped finance the 
strike, and that Claimants benefited by increased wage'S 
resulting therefrom. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE 
Attorneys for the Petitioners 
351 South State .Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
By Allan E. Mecham, 
Attorney at Law 
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